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Disability studies as an academic fi eld has long sought to highlight the lived experiences of people 
with disabilities, thereby giving voice to a population that has been the object of much discourse but 
rarely its subject. Despite the fi eld’s engagement with various conditions, there is limited scholarly 
work on the personal meanings of amputation and prosthetics usage. Experiences associated with 
the loss of part(s) of the face, in particular, have remained uncharted. In this article, I address this 
lacuna by drawing on interviews with twenty affected individuals. Situating their accounts in con-
temporary scholarship on bodily difference within the humanities and social sciences, I demonstrate 
that losing part(s) of the face calls for various ways of ‘doing’ difference in everyday life. This em-
pirical-philosophical analysis serves three purposes. On an empirical level, the article unpacks the 
everyday doing of facial difference, showing it simultaneously involves social, embodied, and mate-
rial dimensions. On a practical level, this integrative understanding of facial difference complements 
prevalent approaches to ‘disfi gurement’ that construe it as an individual—biomedical or psychoso-
cial—problem. On a theoretical level the article clarifi es and advances the concept of doing, which 
plays a key role in gender studies, phenomenology, and science and technology studies.
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Introduction: 
Living with a partly amputated face
Disability studies as an academic fi eld has tradi-
tionally sought to highlight the lived experiences 
of people with disabilities, thereby giving voice 
to a population that has been the object of much 
discourse but rarely its subject. Despite this fi eld’s 
engagement with various conditions, it features 
limited scholarly work on the personal meanings 
of amputation and prosthetics usage (Murray and 
Forshaw 2013). Thus, research in the humanities 
often approaches prosthesis as an analytical 
trope (Jain 1999), metaphor (Mitchell and Sny-
der 2000), or historical phenomenon (Neumann 
2010). This literature also discusses prosthetic 
imageries (Booher 2010; Eyler 2013), or the his-
tory of prosthetics (Ott, Serlin and Mihm 2002). 
The small number of studies that attend to the 
perspective of people affected by amputation in-
clude autoethnographic accounts (Kurzman 2001; 
Sobchack 2006; 2010), and empirical scholarship 
on experiences associated with prosthesis usage 
and amputation (Murray 2009; Norlyk, Martinsen 
and Kjaer-Petersen 2013; Mathias and Harcourt 
2014).
In the case of people who lost part(s) of the 
face and carry a facial prosthesis, this lacuna is 
even more marked; research into the lived experi-
ences associated with their particular condition is 
virtually non-existent. There is a growing body of 
literature on ‘disfi gurement’ in general, but studies 
investigating this topic mostly approach it through 
a biomedical or psychosocial lens (Aarabi, Long-
aker and Gurtner 2007; Trainor, Dixon and Dixon 
2009; Rumsey and Harcourt, 2004; Valente 2009).1 
This focus mirrors the dualistic manner in which 
facial difference is commonly construed within 
healthcare, namely as an individual problem, that 
concerns either a mechanized body or a disem-
bodied mind.
My work of the past years has sought to 
complement the literature on ‘disfi gurement’ by 
exploring what it means to live with a partly ampu-
tated face. Analysing affected individuals’ stories, 
my colleagues and I investigated the everyday 
usage of facial prosthetics (Yaron, Widdershoven 
and Slatman 2017), the embodiment of facial 
difference (Yaron et al. 2017), and the role of in/
visible difference in everyday social interactions 
(Yaron et al. 2018). As our work reveals, individ-
uals who lack part(s) of the face contend with 
physical impairments as well as a radically altered 
appearance. Responding to everyday challenges 
associated with both, they ‘do’ their facial differ-
ence in various ways (Yaron et al. 2017: 303-304). 
The precise nature of this doing, however, remains 
to be unpacked. What shapes does the doing of 
facial difference take in the everyday life of indi-
viduals who have lost facial areas? In this article, 
I answer this question by situating affected indi-
viduals’ accounts in contemporary scholarship on 
the enactment of gendered and disabled bodies 
within the humanities and social sciences. This 
empirical-philosophical approach, I conclude, ex-
pands our understanding of facial difference, while 
supplementing prevalent healthcare approaches 
to ‘disfi gurement’ and advancing the concept of 
doing itself.
Interrogating the everyday meaning 
of  facial difference
The following pages present my analysis of the 
lived experiences associated with the loss of 
part(s) of the face. Examining both old and new 
empirical material, I show that affected individuals’ 
stories revolve around the ongoing doing of facial 
difference in various everyday settings. To unpack 
the distinct, interwoven shapes this doing takes, 
I mobilize and contrast several comparative con-
cepts, including ‘interactional accomplishment’, 
‘gender performativity’, and ‘enactment’. Used 
to investigate everyday practices—a common 
concern in contemporary humanities and social 
sciences—this set of loosely connected approach-
es each highlights particular aspects of the doing 
of bodily difference. It is by no means my inten-
tion to provide a thorough analysis of this family of 
concepts; instead, I use each concept to draw out 
distinct ways in which facial difference is done, as 
featured in affected individuals’ accounts. 
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The analysis below draws on interviews I 
conducted with twenty individuals who lack part(s) 
of the face. These interviews formed part of an 
empirical-philosophical study into the everyday 
meaning of facial difference. Participants were 
eight women and twelve men, ranging in age from 
42 to 84. Each lost a nose, eye-socket (including 
the eye), upper cheek, or larger segments of the 
face. Nineteen respondents were amputated dur-
ing medical treatment for head and neck cancer; 
one had a fi reworks accident (see table 1 for an 
overview of the participants). Interviewees all con-
front various disabilities, and their appearance 
has altered signifi cantly. This is due to the atypical 
look of the amputated facial area, as well as their 
usage of several more-or-less visible medical aids. 
Thus, participants wear conspicuous bandages, 
band-aids, or patches to cover the amputation site. 
They also carry a less noticeable silicone pros-
thetic device—a so-called ‘facial prosthesis’—that 
is tailor-made to resemble the lost facial limb(s) 
and is attached to the face by means of medici-
nal glue or implanted magnets. The study received 
ethical clearance from the medical-ethical review 
board of the Dutch hospital from which I recruit-
ed interviewees (fi le number NL35486.031.11). 
Interview Name & age Lost facial area Cause Aids used
1 John, 65 Nose Cancer Nasal prosthesis (on implants), gauze 
dressing,
2 Timothy, 65 Part of the left cheek Cancer Cheek prosthesis (glued)
3 Dora, 65 Nose Cancer Nasal prosthesis (glued), dressing
4 Laura, 45 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (on implants), Band-Aid 
5 Stella, 47 Nose Cancer Nasal prosthesis (glued), dressing
6 Walter, 65 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (locks into the amputa-
ted area)
7 Arnold, 72 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (on implants), band-aid
8 Ray, 66 Right part of the nose Cancer Nasal prosthesis (glued), dressing, band-
aid
9 Lisa, 73 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (on implants), eye 
patch
10 Bertha, 76 Nose & eye socket Cancer Complex prosthesis (glued)
11 Gregory, 81 Eye socket Accident Orbita prosthesis (glued)
12 Oliver, 60 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (glued), eye patch
13 Harry, 79 Nose & eye socket Cancer Complex prosthesis (glued), dressing, 
band-aid
14 Audrey, 84 Nose Cancer Nasal prosthesis (glued)
15 Leon, 52 Nose Cancer Nasal prosthesis (glued)
16 Gabriel, 70 Nose, eye socket & 
part of forehead and 
temple
Cancer Complex prosthesis (glued), dressing
17 Christine, 72 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (glued), dressing, band-
aid 
18 Ralph, 42 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (on implants), band-aid
19 Winston, 63 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (on implants), dressing
20 Thelma, 57 Eye socket Cancer Orbita prosthesis (glued), dressing
Table 1: overview of study participants
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I discussed and obtained respondents’ informed 
consent at the start of each interview.
Accomplishing difference through 
display and conduct
Speaking of what it means to lose part(s) of the 
face, the study’s participants all noted that their 
visible facial difference is an issue in social en-
counters. Particularly when going out in public 
while wearing a visible cover, respondents’ unusu-
al face attracts much unwanted attention:
“I walked around wearing a patch on my eye, 
and that generated a lot of, yes, stares and 
questions and comments. I wasn’t anony-
mous anymore, I was always the centre of at-
tention, yes, attention I found to be negative” 
(Ralph)2
Alluding to its power to stop others in their tracks, 
Stella jokingly calls the gauze dressing she some-
times wears over her missing nose an “emergen-
cy warning triangle”. Interviewees dislike being 
the object of notice, indicating it makes them feel 
self-conscious, ashamed, or inferior (Yaron et al. 
2018). Still, most choose to ignore covert staring, 
especially from children. Some actively address 
more offensive forms of unsolicited notice like fi n-
ger pointing or giggling, for instance by pointedly 
staring back.
The way facial difference is handled in these 
social interactions resonates with what sociolo-
gists of gender Candace West, Don Zimmerman, 
and Sarah Fenstermaker call the ‘interactional ac-
complishment’ of difference (West and Zimmer-
man 1987; West and Fenstermaker 1995; 2002). 
Social categories like gender, race, and class, 
they argue, do not refer to static phenomena that 
precede social exchanges. Instead, members of 
society accomplish such categories during every-
day interactions. Gender, for instance, is “a routine, 
methodical and recurrent accomplishment (…), an 
achieved property of situated conduct” (West and 
Zimmerman 1987: 126). Social categories are ac-
complished through the repetition of typical acts, 
displays, and speech patterns that are associated 
with, for example, femininity, blackness, or ‘posh-
ness’.3 Achieving gender, race, and class lies at the 
very heart of human sociality; The doing of differ-
ence structures each and every social situation 
(e.g. sex-segregated public bathrooms, sports, 
dating practices). Social actors continuously 
evaluate whether they themselves and others 
establish relevant social identities appropriately. 
To accomplish difference, therefore, necessarily 
means to stand the risk of assessment. Such as-
sessment has real consequences: individuals are 
held accountable for how they accomplish gender, 
race, or class, and penalized if they fail to do so 
appropriately (West and Zimmerman 1987).
The concept of interactional accomplish-
ment underlines how visible facial difference 
is achieved through display and conduct in the 
daily life of the participants in my study. Others’ 
unwanted attention in effect holds respondents 
accountable for deviating from the norm prescrib-
ing ‘proper’ appearance. Since they are (implicitly) 
expected to answer to others’ curiosity, such at-
tention casts interviewees as less entitled to the 
‘civil inattention’ accorded to those with a typical 
exterior (Goffman 1967). Indeed, blatant staring, 
giggling, and fi nger pointing—forms of what disa-
bility scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson calls 
‘uncivil attention’ (2006; 2009)—clearly penalize 
respondents for their unusual appearance. Fa-
cial difference can therefore be said to be done in 
interaction.
By using facial prosthetic device, partici-
pants regularly manage to avoid others’ attention:
“Yes, I can just tell that since I have gotten my 
prosthesis, that less people really stare (...). 
I could tell instantly, immediately in that fi rst 
week already. Yes, [it’s different] than when 
you’re wearing a Band-Aid. (...). People don’t 
notice [my eye] as much” (Laura, wears an 
eye-socket prosthesis)
Since it recovers facial completeness, this de-
vice may restore users’ ability to ‘pass as normal’ 
(Yaron, Widdershoven and Slatman 2017). To 
pass, interviewees must ensure the prosthesis 
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‘fi ts’ their face and vice versa. Nevertheless, others 
regularly realize the device is in fact artifi cial. This 
mostly happens when respondents stand in close 
proximity to others for prolonged periods of time: 
“Sometimes at the cash register, because you’d be 
standing close to people, it happens that the ‘nose’ 
is suddenly discovered. [Their] gaze is like, ‘wait a 
minute...’” (Stella). Participants mostly ignore such 
instances of discovery, although they sometimes 
address them. Their efforts to pass as normal, as 
well as their responses to being discovered, form 
another way of doing difference through display 
and conduct.
However, the accomplishment of gender, 
race, or class is distinct from the doing of facial 
difference in one signifi cant regard. As anthropol-
ogist Marcel Mauss’ concept of ‘body techniques’ 
illustrates, people signal their membership in par-
ticular groups (e.g. societies, professions, genera-
tions) by adopting sometimes subtle though very 
much recognizable stylistic ‘signatures’: particular 
ways of moving, positioning the body, gesturing, 
etcetera (Mauss 1979). In the case of disability, 
however, many typical ways of appearing and mov-
ing are associated with impairment and the usage 
of assistive devices. These are therefore not the 
product of a socialization process4. Indeed, rather 
than exhibiting characteristic mannerisms, many 
people with disabilities in fact develop body tech-
niques aimed at suppressing or concealing their 
difference in favour of looking ‘normal’. Likewise, 
respondents’ attempts to pass as normal are ori-
ented towards appearing ordinary. Their ways of 
doing facial difference, therefore, revolve around 
endeavouring to accomplish normalcy rather than 
difference.
Performing identity via discourse
Next to discussing display and conduct, interview-
ees also shared stories on how their facial differ-
ence is spoken about. Thus, others regularly ask 
about or comment on participants’ unusual ap-
pearance. Respondents mostly view polite queries 
as intrusive though relatively benign. Some ques-
tions and comments, however, are not so innocent. 
Discussing others’ reactions to the bandage she 
initially wore to cover her missing nose, Dora says: 
“[T]otal strangers (…) would say (…) ‘Well you’ve had 
some rap on the nose, haven’t you?’ (…) and ‘You 
have a weird noggin’”. Other offensive utterances 
respondents mention include: ’How do you fi nd the 
courage to go on?’, ‘If I were you, I’d just put an end 
to it all’, or ‘Can’t [doctors] do something about your 
face?’. When others discover the prosthetic to be 
a fake, they may also remark upon the device (‘It’s 
such a clever solution!’) or ask to touch it.
To understand the role of language in how 
facial difference is done, I turn to feminist phi-
losopher Judith Butler’s notion of ‘performativity’ 
(Butler 2007; 2011). Departing from an analysis 
of drag, Butler’s work challenges common distinc-
tions between sex and gender. The material body, 
in her account, exists beyond meaning-making but 
can never be approached outside of it: since hu-
man experience is necessarily mediated by signs, 
we can have no direct access to some type of 
 ‘pre-‘ or ‘extradiscursive’ bodily reality (Butler 2007: 
xx). Human beings, for Butler, “come into being” in 
language: it is only through their assimilation into 
the order of signifi cation that they emerge as sub-
jects (idem: 8). The sexed body is therefore always 
already gendered: immediately after birth (and of-
ten before), the new-born’s body is classifi ed as 
either female or male on the basis of anatomical 
features (e.g. genitalia) and thereby received into 
a signifi cation system. In Butler’s words: “medical 
interpellation (…) shifts an infant from an ‘it’ to a 
‘she’ or a ‘he,’ and in that naming, the girl is ‘girled,’ 
brought into the domain of language and kinship” 
(Butler 2007: xvii).
With Michel Foucault, Butler argues that sub-
jects are produced as such through the repetition 
of patterns of expression.5 Individuals are neither 
the authors nor the origins of the statements they 
make, but draw these from established discours-
es—repositories of historically rooted linguistic 
forms (e.g. phrases, jargons, plotlines) that or-
ganize communication. When subjects reproduce 
specifi c types of speech, they in fact assert their 
and others’ membership in a distinct social group. 
Such utterances are ‘performative’, for Butler, in 
that they establishing speakers (and addressees) 
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as particular subjects. ‘Hello, I’m Mrs. Smith, nice 
to meet you,’ for instance, positions the speaker 
as a married woman. Importantly, discourses are 
inherently normative, constituting certain individ-
uals as members of a devalued social category.
When others bring up participants’ unusual 
appearance, from a Butlerian perspective, they in 
fact perform the visibly different person as an ex-
traordinary, deviant spectacle. Specifi cally, such 
utterances constitute respondents as objects of 
ridicule, suffering victims, incapable of having a 
worthwhile (social) life, or in need of medical in-
tervention. This type of everyday language refl ects 
stereotypical meaning commonly attributed to 
atypical bodies. Blending into a “disfi gurement im-
agery” (Talley 2014: 18, 28-30), representations of 
facial variance generally depict it as a pitiful state 
requiring a medical ‘fi x’. Using Butler, it becomes 
possible to understand both these representa-
tions and the everyday utterances that echo and 
instantiate them as part of a normative discourse 
on visible facial difference—a discourse that pro-
duces affected individuals as tragic (or, alterna-
tively, heroic) victims—regardless of the fact most 
live rather ordinary lives.
As Butler indicates, subjects also perform 
their own identity through language. Indeed, next 
to utterances made by others, interviewees do 
their visible difference verbally as well. This type 
of talk may occur when they reprimand others for 
staring, pointing, or giggling:
“[T]here were those girls (...), teenagers, right. 
And they obviously noticed something and 
started laughing constantly, ‘hahaha’, you 
know. And then at some point I said, ‘You 
should ask your mom to teach you some 
manners maybe and not gape at people’” 
(Dora)
Another type of talk follows more benign types of 
notice. When asked politely about their facial dif-
ference, respondents may explain about their con-
dition. Taking control of and defusing a mutually 
awkward situation, they assure their interlocutor 
that they handle everything ‘just fi ne’. Similarly, par-
ticipants may opt for anticipatory self-disclosure 
in situations in which others are likely to discover 
their face is partly prosthetic6:
“[M]y wife [and I] gave (…) a marriage course 
[to recently married couples from Church], 
and then (…) I would always just say it. And, 
well it’s over then. You can tell that people 
[are] no longer as fi xated on your face any-
more (…). Because I’d openly laid it out to be 
spoken about” (Timothy)
Finally, respondents may also joke about their ar-
tifi cial facial limb with others who know about it, 
like (grand)children, colleagues or friends. Oliver, 
a high school teacher, discusses a pun he some-
times uses in conversation with students:
“Well, if someone needs to be taken aside 
[for] detention, [I’d say, ‘let’s have] a talk un-
der three eyes.’ And then you see them, you 
see someone all blushing” (Oliver, carries an 
eye-socket prosthesis)
Explanations and jokes, in particular, acknowledge 
interviewees’ difference while simultaneously nor-
malizing it. Such talk construes the person in ques-
tion as being at ease with their uncommon face. 
It also establishes that they are a fundamentally 
ordinary human being, despite their uncommon 
appearance. Moreover: explanations and jokes 
indicate the facially different person deserves 
the same civility accorded to other members of 
society.
Participants responses to unwanted at-
tention can in fact be read as forms of Butlerian 
resistance. Adopting a Derridean strand into her 
thought, Butler asserts that the repetition of estab-
lished patterns of discourse is in fact a type of cita-
tion. Since every reiteration necessarily alters the 
meaning of the utterance it echoes, citation opens 
up spaces for difference. Speakers therefore do 
not only emulate discursive patterns, but may also 
improvise upon them, for instance through paro-
dy or out-of-context usage. Subversive citations, 
particularly, may undermine and resist oppressive 
categorizations. By emphasizing their fundamen-
tal normalcy and humanity, interviewees upset 
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conventional representations of ‘disfi gurement’ 
as a pitiful, exceptional, and dehumanizing state. 
By jokingly giving new meanings to old phrases, 
they ‘own’ their difference while resisting being re-
duced to it. Through these verbal forms of doing 
difference, participants defy being ‘othered’ while 
encouraging interlocutors to approach them as or-
dinary, fully human actors, worthy of equal regard.
Doing lived embodiment
The concepts of interactional accomplishment 
and performativity both highlight how bodies are 
done through various types of signifi cation (dis-
play, conduct, language) that structure sociality. 
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the experi-
encing body fi gures in these accounts. As Carrie 
Noland writes: “Butler has a meagre account of 
both embodiment and interoception. (…) [S]he ne-
glects to theorize the performing body’s proprio-
ceptive, kinesthetic, even affective experience of 
moving in prescribed ways” (Noland 2009: 171). 
This criticism, I argue, equally applies for West 
and her collaborators. To be sure, the stories of 
the participants in my study illustrate that doing 
bodily difference encompasses a marked embod-
ied dimension.
In the interviews, respondents spoke of var-
ious bodily experiences. All contend with sensory 
impairments, including the (partial) loss of smell, 
skin sensitivity, or sight. Discussing her reduced 
visual fi eld after losing her eye, Lisa says: “While 
cycling [with friends] (…) if they ride on the left, 
we can’t converse and I can’t see them very well”. 
Other interviewees report problems with navigat-
ing steps, pouring drinks, stacking boxes, tasting 
food, feeling a kiss, or smelling hazardous fumes. 
In addition, many also deal with unpleasant bod-
ily sensations in and around the amputation site, 
such as chronic pain, phantom itching, or irrita-
tion. Others remain conscious of the prosthesis: 
“I’m constantly aware of that thing. I feel it, for 
sure, that it’s loose, a bit” (Leon). Finally, anatom-
ical changes to participants’ sinuses may affect 
the trajectory of air and mucus. This results in ei-
ther hindering dryness or leakage. As Christine, 
who lost her eye, says: “[L]uckily I don’t often 
come down with the cold, but I’ve had it happen 
sometimes (…) [that mucus] would leak from 
underneath the prosthesis. (…) [T]hat was a dis-
aster”. Consequently, participants can no longer 
use their body as they did before; their formerly 
taken for granted capacity to pursue everyday ac-
tivities has been disrupted. Gradually adjusting, 
interviewees develop an array of new bodily hab-
its to anticipate, avoid, and manage disruptions 
(Yaron et al. 2017). By fi nding a more careful way 
of walking, a new manner of kissing, or strategies 
to handle unpleasant sensations, they in fact 
learn to do their body differently.
This bodily doing recalls phenomenologist 
Iris Marion Young’s writing on gender in On fe-
male body experience: ‘Throwing like a girl’ and 
other essay (2005). As Young demonstrates, 
the physical im/possibilities afforded by female 
bodies call for distinctive ways of enacting the 
body.7 Pregnancy involves adjusting to one’s 
growing girth and may cause tiredness and nau-
sea. Breasts may be sensitive, produce mother’s 
milk, or hamper one’s ability to engage in sports 
(Rodrigues 2018: 266-268). Menstruation may be 
accompanied by cramps and requires the man-
agement of fl ow. Women, in other words, live 
through the inevitable materiality of their bodies. 
Young’s account therefore opens up a perspec-
tive on bodily doing that goes beyond signifi ca-
tion to encompass lived experience. Similarly, the 
im/possibilities afforded by a partly amputated 
face mean that affected individuals need to de-
velop new ways to perceive, sense, and move as 
they relearn their altered body and world. 
But Young’s account of female embodiment 
also explores women’s experiences in relation to 
the socio-cultural meanings accorded to their bod-
ies. Youngs analysis of feminine motility, for ex-
ample, argues that the cautious inhibition charac-
terizing many women’s movements in fact refl ects 
internalized gendered norms (Young 2005; Weiss 
2015). As she writes: “The more a girl assumes 
her status as feminine, the more she takes her-
self to be fragile and immobile, and the more she 
actively enacts her own body inhibition” (Young 
2005: 44). Young’s take on gender emphasizes 
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that such norms affect not only the way in which 
women present their social identity, but also how 
they use and experience their bodies. Gender is 
shaped both through the meanings inscribed upon 
the feminine body, and the material vicissitudes of 
that body. Indeed, Young’s originality lies in the 
fact she successfully weaves together these two 
seemingly disparate dimensions of embodiment, 
while stressing the fundamental materiality of 
both.
The doing of facial difference, too, simulta-
neously encompasses both dimensions. Partici-
pants’ stories about spilling tea due to a limited 
visual fi eld, failing to sense a kiss on the cheek, or 
having mucus run down the corner of an eye, all 
speak to practical-functional concerns. But such 
incidents also testify of social ones: the embar-
rassments arising from bodily mishaps. 
And indeed, the (possibility of) social cen-
sure respondents confront affects how they use 
and experience their body. Unwanted attention—
as well as the work involved in anticipating, avoid-
ing and managing it—effectively constrains their 
ability to inhabit public spaces:
“In the past (…) I would go out and grab a 
sandwich or a milk carton or whatever. And 
I would pull on my pants in a fl ash and run 
outside (…). Now I would have to wait an hour 
and a half [getting the prosthesis to fi t just 
right], before I can leave the house” (Leon)
Interviewees also restrain their facial movements 
to ensure others do not discover the prosthesis is 
a fake. Many keep the affected side of their face 
averted, chew or yawn carefully to prevent the de-
vice from gaping, or control their blinking to ensure 
their prosthetic and organic eyes ‘match’. 
Following the amputation, the face effec-
tively takes on a new existential meaning. As the 
locus of potential physical as well as social per-
ils, this body part has become much more ‘pres-
ent’ in participants’ consciousness. Such pres-
ence disrupts their ability to focus on everyday 
activities. What is more: being rendered a liability, 
the face has come to require ongoing monitoring 
and management. 
Enacting artefacts, environments, and 
assistive devices 
Young’s writing on embodiment regularly alludes 
to the ways in which physical artefacts and en-
vironments tie in with the enactment of female 
bodies. After all, body, object, and world come 
into being simultaneously according to the phe-
nomenological tradition in which she operates. 
Nevertheless, since Young focuses on bodily ex-
perience, her analyses provide little explicit atten-
tion to the materialities involved in bodily doing. 
Similarly, both West and her collaborators and But-
ler centre the meaning of things, rather than their 
materiality. As participants’ stories demonstrate, 
however, the doing of facial difference has a solid 
material dimension.
As established, respondents use medical 
aids such as bandages, eye patches, and prosthe-
ses. The materiality of these aids affects the doing 
of facial difference. For instance, Laura’s prosthet-
ic eye-socket irritates her skin. She therefore re-
serves the device for outings, preferring her more 
comfortable bandage when staying at home. Oth-
ers’ comfort is also involved. Thus, the infl exibility 
and coldness of Stella’s artifi cial nose prompted 
her to develop new ways to kiss loved ones. The 
fact passing as normal requires that the prosthe-
sis look like a natural part of the face, also calls for 
material work (Yaron, Slatman and Widdershoven 
2017). This may involve daily maintenance to en-
sure the device remains in good shape, but also 
various creative adjustments:
“The edges [of my nasal prosthesis] (…) start 
becoming wavy [after a while] and then it 
gets, well, less nice-looking (…), so at some 
point I will make a small cut-out [points to the 
lower corner of his ‘nostril’], and then I can 
pinch [the two parts] neatly together, and it 
stays put better” (Gabriel, wears a complex 
prosthesis that replaces his nose, left eye, 
and parts of his temple)
In addition, interviewees repeatedly reported us-
ing other types of objects to help them handle the 
changes imposed by the amputation. They install 
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mirrors on their bicycle to compensate for limit-
ed visual fi eld, use crayons to mark off distance 
while stacking boxes, or wear shawls when going 
outside in winter to protect their now-vulnerable si-
nuses. Respondents also use various artefacts to 
increase their chances of passing as normal: “To 
somewhat disguise that eye I choose really fl ashy 
glasses [that] block [of the edges of the prosthe-
sis] from view” (Thelma). Others use a sunlamp or 
theatre make-up to ensure their skin tone and the 
device’s hue keep matching, despite changes to 
their skin tone. These everyday objects, then, can 
also be said to do facial difference.
Environmental conditions play a role in the 
doing of facial difference as well. Wind and rain 
may blow away or drench appliances:
“I [keep on] my gauze dressing, if I don’t have 
to leave the house. But not outside, no, no. 
(…) I mean, you can’t walk in the rain with 
it. You can’t walk in the wind. It’s really for 
home” (Stella)
Cold weather can cause pain in the amputated area 
of the face. It may also redden the skin and cause 
silicone to shrink—both of which make the pros-
thesis’ artifi ciality more evident, thereby thwarting 
participants’ efforts to pass as normal. The lay-out 
of public spaces may also affect passing. Check-
outs, busses, and cafés afford prolonged encoun-
ters between strangers that invite unwanted atten-
tion. By contrast, busy streets encourage moving 
along quickly, which helps respondents pass. Sim-
ilarly, neon lighting makes the prosthesis seem 
fake, while daylight and shade are more forgiving.
The concept of ‘enactment’ as developed by 
science and technology scholar Annemarie Mol 
in The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice 
(2002), can help account for this material doing. 
Mol leverages this concept to investigate how 
medical knowledge is mobilized in hospital set-
tings, through various practices involving human 
and non-human actors alike. The term ‘enact-
ment’, she maintains, captures the fundamental 
materiality of practices, their dynamic, emergent 
character, and the way they assemble disparate 
elements (Mol 2002: 32, 37-43). 
But how do patients enact disease? ‘En-
acting bodies, Embodied Action: The example of 
Hypoglycaemia’ (Mol and Law 2004) investigates 
how hypoglycaemia is done in the everyday life 
of affected individuals8. Some ways of enacting 
this condition revolve around knowing it, for in-
stance by measuring blood glucose or learning to 
sense an oncoming drop in sugar levels (‘hypo’). 
Such knowledge, Mol stresses, is geared towards 
anticipating and counteracting manifestations 
of the condition: “In the daily lives of people with 
diabetes, hypoglycaemia is something [patients] 
know about, but the point of their dealings with it 
is not to gather knowledge but to intervene” (Mol 
and Law 2004: 49). Interventions involve ‘incorpo-
rating’ various objects. For instance, patients use 
medical instruments to monitor blood glucose or 
inject insulin, and eat snacks to offset hypo’s. In-
terventions may also involve ‘excorporating’ the 
body by “shifting out” or transferring some of its 
actions outwards (idem: 53). Thus, patients keep 
snacks in strategic locations to be able to deal 
with dropping blood glucose. Enacting disease, 
the body incorporates its material environment, 
while also excorporating into it.
Similarly, individuals who lack part(s) of the 
face incorporate assistive devices. They may also 
incorporate everyday objects such as shawls or 
sunglasses. And they incorporate their environ-
ment, for instance by seeking out natural light, 
shadow, and corners while avoiding neon lights 
and central locations. In addition, respondents 
also excorporate their facial difference, adjusting 
their physical surroundings (e.g. installing bicycle 
mirrors, marking off distance with crayons) to ac-
commodate their altered face. These incorpora-
tions and excorporations are all part of the doing 
of facial limb absence, part of a newly-developed 
relationship between the altered, extended body 
and its various contexts. As Mol observes, bodies 
have semi-permeable boundaries: inside and out-
side, self and other, organism and artefact are not 
so easily distinguished. Moreover, participants’ ef-
forts to accomplish a good fi t between their face 
and prosthesis illustrate that the body is an essen-
tially unfi nished, open project, requiring supple-
mentation as well as continuous work to produce 
Gili Yaron
19Women, Gender & Research
Living with a partly amputated face, doing facial difference
No. 2 2021
and maintain its integrity. As Mol and Law put it: 
“[k]eeping yourself whole is one of the tasks of life. 
It is not a given, but must be achieved, both be-
neath the skin and beyond, in practice” (2004: 57, 
emphasis in the original).
Conclusions: Doing facial difference
Zooming in on the lived experiences of individuals 
who lost part(s) of the face, this article has sought 
to expand our understanding of facial difference 
and thereby contribute to scholarship on amputa-
tion, prosthetics, and facial difference. The ampu-
tation of facial areas, as demonstrated above, sig-
nals a major shift in the formerly taken for granted 
relationship between participants’ body and its 
social and material environment. Respondents’ 
altered, extended face no longer quite fi ts their 
world. All the while, that world proves not-so wel-
coming for bodies that diverge from the norm. As 
Garland-Thomson argues, disability is a relational 
phenomenon, the function of ‘misfi ts’ between the 
impaired body’s physical make-up and contexts 
that fail to accommodate bodily variance (Gar-
land-Thomson 2011; Weiss 2015). This lack of 
fi t, as interviewees’ stories reveal, elicits various 
ways of doing facial difference.
To unpack the multiple dimensions involved 
in this doing, I interpreted my empirical fi ndings 
against the background of four distinct approach-
es to the enactment of bodily difference. West, 
Zimmerman, and Fenstermaker’s concept of inter-
actional accomplishment provided insight in the 
role of display and conduct in social interactions 
between the visibly different person and others, 
while underscoring that these revolve around ac-
countability and penalization. Butler’s notion of 
performativity highlighted the role of language in 
these interactions. It also shed light on norma-
tive discourses informing how facial difference 
is done in everyday social exchanges, as well as 
on ways in which affected individuals resist and 
upend prevalent meanings attached to ‘disfi gure-
ment’. Importantly, both these approaches helped 
establish that it is normalcy rather than deviance 
which is at stake in the doing of facial difference. 
Young’s analysis of sensory-motor experience 
made for a deeper understanding of the embod-
ied dimensions of the doing of facial difference. 
Mol’s concept of enactment, fi nally, drew attention 
to the material affordances of medical aids, every-
day artefacts, and environments, as these tie in 
with the doing of facial difference. In this sense, 
the sociology of gender, phenomenology, and sci-
ence and technology studies provide complemen-
tary insights into this doing.
As these approaches reveal, facial differ-
ence is done in shifting arrangements in which 
bodies, norms, meanings, artefacts, and environ-
ments meet. The active doing of facial difference, 
however, is always also a passive ‘being done’. 
While self and other both do facial difference in 
interaction, this doing is co-determined by interac-
tional norms as well as common representations 
of ‘disfi gurement’. Moreover: although they active-
ly adapt to their altered face, individuals with facial 
difference are nevertheless constrained by that 
face’s im/possibilities, and those of aids, everyday 
objects, and settings9. As Lisa Käll concludes in 
her discussion of Butler’s concept of performativ-
ity, voluntarism and determinism may go hand in 
hand (Käll 2015).
Understanding what it means to lose part(s) 
of the face, requires simultaneously addressing 
the social, embodied, and material dimensions of 
facial difference. Indeed, it is only by taking these 
three perspectives in concert, that it becomes 
possible to arrive at an integrative account of fa-
cial difference. Arguably, this point holds for bodily 
variance in general. Such an integrative account 
has much to offer healthcare. After all, adequate-
ly informing, caring for, and supporting patients, 
requires a fi rm grasp of how they experience and 
respond to their altered-body-in-context. 
An integrative account of facial difference 
may thereby complement how ‘disfi gurement’ is 
currently approached in healthcare, namely as 
an either biomedical or a psycho-social problem. 
This outlook is prevalent in research as well as in 
practice, including preoperative counselling, care 
and support, and rehabilitation. Here, I will restrict 
myself to a pertinent example I encountered in the 
hospital in the form of the ‘disfi gurement’ protocol 
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offering postoperative nursing guidelines for pa-
tient care. This protocol focuses primarily on the 
physical healing process after the amputation 
surgery, but nurses are also encouraged to mon-
itor signs of ‘psychological dissociation’ follow-
ing the patient’s fi rst confrontation with a mirror. 
‘Body image’ is mentioned in this context, but this 
term is far removed from its original meaning, 
which indicates “the physical, social and imagi-
native aspects of bodily experience” (Rodrigues 
2018: 259). In the clinic, ‘body image’ narrowly re-
fers to the patient’s psychic attitude (‘cognitions’) 
regarding their changed appearance.
In this way, the ‘disfi gurement’ protocol 
evokes the patient as an organic machine con-
taining a disembodied mind. As disability theo-
rist Margrit Shildrick argues in her phenomeno-
logically-informed study of heart transplantation, 
such dualism is fundamentally reductionist (Shil-
drick et al. 2009). By upholding it, healthcare fails 
to recognize and address the inherent entangle-
ment of body and psyche, as well as the existen-
tial impact of bodily changes. As a result, patients’ 
attempts to make sense of their radically altered 
bodily being are relegated to the background. All 
the while, the social is curiously absent in the 
protocol; formal care is restricted to the individ-
ual patient’s body (and to a lesser extent, mind). 
And indeed, not only do patients’ embodiment 
and social embeddedness disappear from view, 
but also their ongoing daily negotiations with the 
materialities of medical aids, everyday artefacts, 
and physical environments10. 
Shildrick calls for a critical turn in feminist 
bioethics (Shildrick 2008). Insights from post-
structuralism and postmodernism, she argues, 
can help the fi eld move beyond traditional wom-
en’s issues and the ethics of care. The “post-
conventional canon” may thereby offer a truly 
critical alternative to mainstream bioethics (Shil-
drick 2008: 34). Like her earlier work, Shildrick’s 
heart transplants project again demonstrates 
the ‘leakiness’ of the body: the fact that bodies—
and therefore selves—are inherently vulnerable, 
open-ended, fragmented, and saturated with dif-
ference. Her goal is to “dispense with the notion 
of a core self that persists unchanged” (idem: 
38). Like Mol, Shildrick contends that bodily in-
tegrity is an achievement rather than a pre-given 
condition.
These insights are not only vital for bioeth-
ics, but can help to counter healthcare’s dualistic 
thrust. How they may be translated to practice, 
however, remains to be unpacked. Shildrick pro-
poses adopting a phenomenologically informed 
framework in patient care, which will enable ac-
cepting and recognizing alterity, vulnerability, 
and concorporeality (Poole et al. 2009; Shildrick 
2008). Her suggestions nevertheless remain 
somewhat vague in terms of practical applica-
tions. Moreover, as my focus on materiality illus-
trates, patients’ accounts reveal a fuller range of 
experiences than those strictly associated with 
the body. Future work could further explore the 
clinical implications of focusing on the altered 
body-in-context. 
Analysing empirical data on facial differ-
ence against the background of theories on the 
enactment does not only supplement current 
approaches to ‘disfi gurement’. My fi ndings also 
serve to clarify and advance the notion of doing 
itself. By mobilizing and contrasting the concepts 
of interactional accomplishment, performativity 
and enactment, this paper has provided a clear-
er sense of their scope, revealing strengths, di-
vergences, and blind spots. This empirical-phil-
osophical approach thereby further develops a 
set of interrelated though distinct concepts that 
plays a key role in current debates within the so-
ciology of gender, phenomenology, and science 
and technology studies. In this way, theory can 
inform practice, while empirical fi ndings may en-
richen conceptual work.
Gili Yaron
21Women, Gender & Research
Living with a partly amputated face, doing facial difference
No. 2 2021
Notes
 1 For one recent exception, see (Martindale and Fisher 2019) on embodied identity and narrative meaning 
making in facial disfi gurement. As the authors note, scholarship on the ethics of facial transplants of-
fers some theoretical explorations of facial difference and identity, but empirical studies remain scarce. 
 2 Respondents’ names are all pseudonyms. 
 3 According to West, Zimmerman, and Fenstermaker, individuals accomplish gender, race, and class si-
multaneously: the ways in which these categories take shape together therefore result in highly specif-
ic, situated, and shifting confi gurations of difference. 
 4 To somewhat qualify this claim: One notable exception is found in people with a hearing impairment 
who embrace Deaf culture. Another is so-called ‘expressive’ prostheses. which are not designed to re-
semble the lost limb, but rather to openly express the prothesis’ artifi ciality—often through a cyborg-like 
style (Hall and Orzada 2013). 
 5 Butler sees not only language but also expression and signifi cation as performative. Since this section 
focuses on verbal ways of doing facial difference, I use Butler’s account to highlight speech.  
 6 For an overview of interviewees’ strategies in handling unsolicited notice, see (Yaron et al. 2018). 
 7 Although she repeatedly uses the term enactment to describe typically feminine motility, Young’s usage 
of this terms seems almost incidental: she never systematically develops this notion as an analytical 
concept. 
 8 Interestingly, Mol and Law’s account neglects to discuss appearance-related concerns and stigma in the 
enactment of hypoglycaemia. This oversight underlines the importance of the comprehensive approach 
presented in this paper. 
 9 For a similar argument with regard to women’s agency in the context of ‘disfi guring’ breast cancer, see 
(De Boer and Slatman 2018). 
 10 Many nurses undoubtedly address these issues informally on the basis of experience and intuition. 
However, the setup of healthcare practices remains deeply dualistic. Moreover, professionals at present 
lack training, guidelines, and time to provide more integrative forms of care. 
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